Arbeitspapier

Competition and the ratchet effect

The 'ratchet effect' refers to a situation where a principal uses private information that is revealed by an agent's early actions to the agent's later disadvantage, in a context where binding multi-period contracts are not enforceable. In a simple, context-rich environment, we experimentally study the robustness of the ratchet effect to the introduction of ex post competition for principals or agents. While we do observe substantial and significant ratchet effects in the baseline (no competition) case of our model, we find that ratchet behavior is nearly eliminated by labor-market competition; interestingly this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor principals or agents.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3784

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Thema
Ratchet effect
competition
experiment
private information
labor markets
Agency Theory
Asymmetrische Information
Arbeitsmarkt
Wettbewerb
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Charness, Gary
Kuhn, Peter
Villeval, Marie-Claire
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20081126431
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Charness, Gary
  • Kuhn, Peter
  • Villeval, Marie-Claire
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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