Transfer Pricing Regulation and Taxation of Royalty Payments

Konferenzbeitrag

We analyze the implications of OECD methods to regulate transfer pricing and the role of a royalty tax for abusive transfer pricing. We show: (i) Under traditional methods, mispricing of royalty payments does not affect investment, but the Transactional Profit Split Method triggers higher investment to facilitate profit shifting. (ii) Royalty taxation reduces both profit shifting and investment. (iii) A royalty tax rate below the corporate tax rate leads to overinvestment in an ACE tax system.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2017: Alternative Geld- und Finanzarchitekturen - Session: Taxation IV ; No. D19-V2

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT) ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Firm ; Multinational Firms; International Business

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Juranek, Steffen ; Schindler, Dirk ; Schjelderup, Guttorm
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
• (where): Kiel, Hamburg
• (when): 2017

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168118
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET