Arbeitspapier
The duration and outcome of unemployment spells: The role of economic incentives
We investigate how transitions from unemployment are affected by economic incentives and spell duration. Based on unique Norwegian register data that exhibit the rarity of random-assignment-like variation in economic incentives, the causal parameters are identified without reliance on distributional assumptions or functional form restrictions. We find that the hazard rates are negatively affected by the replacement ratio, but that the size of these effects varies considerably among individuals. There is strong negative duration dependence in the employment hazard and positive duration dependence in the ‘discouragement’ hazard. The employment hazard rises substantially in the months just prior to benefit exhaustion.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Memorandum ; No. 2002,06
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Duration Analysis; Optimal Timing Strategies
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- Subject
-
Competing risks
unemployment duration
random assignment
Arbeitslosigkeit
Dauer
Leistungsanreiz
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Røed, Knut
Zhang, Tao
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Oslo, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Oslo
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Røed, Knut
- Zhang, Tao
- University of Oslo, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2002