Arbeitspapier

The New Corporate Governance

In the last few years, there has been a dramatic increase in shareholder engagement on environmental and social issues. In some cases shareholders are pushing companies to take actions that may reduce market value. It is hard to understand this behavior using the dominant corporate governance paradigm based on shareholder value maximization. We explain how jurisprudence has sustained this criterion in spite of its economic weaknesses. To overcome these weaknesses we propose the criterion of shareholder welfare maximization and argue that it can better explain observed behavior. Finally, we outline how shareholder welfare maximization can be implemented in practice.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: New Working Paper Series ; No. 317

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Objectives of the Firm
Business and Securities Law
Thema
Shareholder Value
Shareholder Welfare
Proxy Voting

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hart, Oliver D.
Zingales, Luigi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State
(wo)
Chicago, IL
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hart, Oliver D.
  • Zingales, Luigi
  • University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State

Entstanden

  • 2022

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