Arbeitspapier
Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2008
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Subject
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transparency
private information
common knowledge
Staatliche Information
Vollkommene Information
Spieltheorie
Privatwirtschaft
Asymmetrische Information
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Lindner, Axel
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
- (where)
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Halle (Saale)
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-7334
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Lindner, Axel
- Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
Time of origin
- 2008