Arbeitspapier

Evaluating communication strategies for public agencies: transparency, opacity, and secrecy

This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight to their private information in the transparent case than in case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 8/2008

Classification
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Central Banks and Their Policies
Subject
transparency
private information
common knowledge
Staatliche Information
Vollkommene Information
Spieltheorie
Privatwirtschaft
Asymmetrische Information
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Lindner, Axel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
(where)
Halle (Saale)
(when)
2008

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-7334
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Lindner, Axel
  • Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)

Time of origin

  • 2008

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