Arbeitspapier
Does too much Transparency of Central Banks Prevent Agents from Using their Private Information Efficiently?
This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects of different communication strategies of a central bank: it can either publish no more than its overall assessment of the economy or be more transparent, giving detailed reasons for this assessment. The latter strategy is shown to be superior because it enables agents to use private information and to be less dependent on common knowledge. This result holds true even if the strategies of agents are strategic complements, for which case it has been argued that too much transparency might induce agents to neglect their private knowledge.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 16/2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Central Banks and Their Policies
- Thema
-
transparency
private information
common knowledge
Geldpolitik
Staatliche Information
Asymmetrische Information
Wohlfahrtseffekt
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lindner, Axel
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
- (wo)
-
Halle (Saale)
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:gbv:3:2-6304
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lindner, Axel
- Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle (IWH)
Entstanden
- 2007