Politicians' Social Welfare Criteria: An Experiment with German Legislators

Arbeitspapier

Much economic analysis derives policy recommendations based on social welfare criteria intended to model the preferences of a policy maker. Yet, little is known about policy maker's normative views in a way amenable to this use. In a behavioral experiment, we elicit German legislators' social welfare criteria unconfounded by political economy constraints. When resolving preference conflicts across individuals, politicians place substantially more importance on least-favored than on most-favored alternatives, contrasting with both common aggregation mechanisms and the equal weighting inherent in utilitarianism and the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. When resolving preference conflicts within individuals, we find no support for the commonly used "long-run criterion" which insists that choices merit intervention only if the lure of immediacy may bias intertemporal choice. Politicians' and the public's social welfare criteria largely coincide.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10329

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: General ; Welfare Economics: General
• Subject: positive welfare economics ; politicians ; preference aggregation ; paternalism

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Ambuehl, Sandro ; Blesse, Sebastian ; Doerrenberg, Philipp ; Feldhaus, Christoph ; Ockenfels, Axel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2023

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/271973
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET