Arbeitspapier

How to Boost Countries' Climate Ambitions: Turning Gains from Emissions Trading into Gains for Climate

The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement fall short of the abatement needed to reach the 2°C target. Emissions trading could be a "costless" means to reduce the ambition gap if countries used their gains from trade for additional abatement. However, this requires cooperative behavior. We show that with emissions trading, countries' non-cooperative choices of emissions reduction contributions can lead to even more abatement, provided that these contributions may not be lower than initial NDCs. Intuitively, countries with high climate damages raise their contributions if they can meet them partly through abatement in countries with low abatement costs.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10624

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Paris Agreement
emissions trading
NDCs
game theory

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Böhringer, Christoph
Helm, Carsten
Schürer, Laura
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2023

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Böhringer, Christoph
  • Helm, Carsten
  • Schürer, Laura
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2023

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