Arbeitspapier
How to Boost Countries' Climate Ambitions: Turning Gains from Emissions Trading into Gains for Climate
The Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement fall short of the abatement needed to reach the 2°C target. Emissions trading could be a "costless" means to reduce the ambition gap if countries used their gains from trade for additional abatement. However, this requires cooperative behavior. We show that with emissions trading, countries' non-cooperative choices of emissions reduction contributions can lead to even more abatement, provided that these contributions may not be lower than initial NDCs. Intuitively, countries with high climate damages raise their contributions if they can meet them partly through abatement in countries with low abatement costs.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 10624
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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Paris Agreement
emissions trading
NDCs
game theory
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Böhringer, Christoph
Helm, Carsten
Schürer, Laura
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
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Munich
- (when)
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2023
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Böhringer, Christoph
- Helm, Carsten
- Schürer, Laura
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2023