Arbeitspapier

A common-value auction with state-dependent participation

This paper analyzes a common-value, first-price auction with state-dependent participation. The number of bidders, which is unobservable to them, depends on the true value. For participation patterns with many bidders in each state, the bidding equilibrium may be of a "pooling" type - with high probability, the winning bid is the same across states and is below the ex-ante expected value - or of a "partially revealing" type with no significant atoms in the winning bid distribution and an expected winning bid increasing in the true value. Which of these forms will arise is determined by the likelihood ratio at the top of the signal distribution and the participation across states. We fully characterize this relation and show how the participation pattern determines the extent of information aggregation by the price.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 103

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Auktionstheorie
Informationsökonomik

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Lauermann, Stephan
Wolinsky, Asher
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
(wo)
Bonn and Cologne
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Lauermann, Stephan
  • Wolinsky, Asher
  • University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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