Arbeitspapier

Modeling institutional evolution

This paper proposes an original formal framework to analyze institutional evolution. Institutions have formal (F) and informal (N) aspects that may evolve at different paces, although eventually converging towards each other through an dynamic interactive process. N evolves with capital accumulation, as in learning by doing, and F is optimally chosen by the government who maximizes output given the social and political costs of changing F. As transaction-cost-reducing mechanisms, F and N together define the production technology and affect the income level. As consistent with the evidence, calibrations of the model reveal that optimum F exhibits a punctuated equilibra.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 1012

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Institutions and the Macroeconomy
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Institutions and Growth
Thema
institutional evolution
punctuated equilibria
growth
Institutioneller Wandel
Transaktionskosten
Neue Institutionenökonomik

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Neyapti, Bilin
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum
(wo)
Istanbul
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Neyapti, Bilin
  • TÜSİAD-Koç University Economic Research Forum

Entstanden

  • 2010

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