Arbeitspapier

Does Divorce Law Matter?

In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 439

Classification
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
Subject
Bargaining
divorce
non transferability
Eherecht
Familienökonomik
Privater Transfer
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
Scheidung

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Mariotti, Marco
Manzini, Paola
Fella, Giulio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2002

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Mariotti, Marco
  • Manzini, Paola
  • Fella, Giulio
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2002

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