Arbeitspapier
Does Divorce Law Matter?
In this paper we derive an explicit model of negotiations between spouses when utility is (partially) transferable only in case of separation. We show that inefficient separation may occur in equilibrium even under consensual divorce law. This provides theoretical support for the view that changes in social norms rather than in legislation may be responsible for increasing divorce rates.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 439
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
- Subject
-
Bargaining
divorce
non transferability
Eherecht
Familienökonomik
Privater Transfer
Verhandlungstheorie
Theorie
Scheidung
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Mariotti, Marco
Manzini, Paola
Fella, Giulio
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (when)
-
2002
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mariotti, Marco
- Manzini, Paola
- Fella, Giulio
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Time of origin
- 2002