Suicide terrorism and the weakest link

Arbeitspapier

In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2753

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: conflict ; suicide terrorism ; weakest link ; Colonel Blotto ; Politische Gewalt ; Policy-Mix ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Arce, Daniel G. ; Kovenock, Dan ; Roberson, Brian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30641
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET