Konferenzbeitrag

Why Echo Chambers are Useful

Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into 'echo chambers'? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody's information and generate Paretoimprovements. Polarized preferences create a need for segregation; uncertainty about preferences and the availability of public information magnify this need. Using data from Twitter, we show several behavioral patterns that are consistent with the results of our model.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic Theory - Incomplete Information Games ; No. F05-V2

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Subject
asymmetric information
echo chambers
polarization
debate
cheap talk
information aggregation
Twitter

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schottmüller, Christoph
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
(where)
Kiel, Hamburg
(when)
2019

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Konferenzbeitrag

Associated

  • Schottmüller, Christoph
  • ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft

Time of origin

  • 2019

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