Konferenzbeitrag
Why Echo Chambers are Useful
Why do people appear to forgo information by sorting into 'echo chambers'? We construct a highly tractable multi-sender, multi-receiver cheap talk game in which players choose with whom to communicate. We show that segregation into small, homogeneous groups can improve everybody's information and generate Paretoimprovements. Polarized preferences create a need for segregation; uncertainty about preferences and the availability of public information magnify this need. Using data from Twitter, we show several behavioral patterns that are consistent with the results of our model.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2019: 30 Jahre Mauerfall - Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft - Session: Economic Theory - Incomplete Information Games ; No. F05-V2
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Subject
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asymmetric information
echo chambers
polarization
debate
cheap talk
information aggregation
Twitter
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schottmüller, Christoph
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
- (where)
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Kiel, Hamburg
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Konferenzbeitrag
Associated
- Schottmüller, Christoph
- ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Time of origin
- 2019