An iterative deferred acceptance mechanism for decentralized, fast and fair childcare assignment

Arbeitspapier

We design and implement an iterative, program-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism with ties (IDAT) and apply it to childcare assignment in two German cities. The mechanism can accommodate complementarities in providers' preferences, is fast to terminate even in larger cities, is difficult to manipulate in practice, and produces stable allocations. It can be further sped up by introducing two new features. First, allowing for an arbitrary share of facilities who participate in a centralized manner by submitting a rank-order-list over applicants. Second, by breaking ties in applicants' rank-order-lists on a first-come-first-serve basis, which sets incentives for programs to propose faster.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 21-095

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Market Design ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Education and Inequality
• Subject: Childcare assignment ; deferred acceptance algorithm

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Reischmann, Tobias ; Klein, Thilo ; Giegerich, Sven
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
• (where): Mannheim
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/247704
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET