Artikel

Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement

We study impersonal exchange, and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and ``trust-building.'' The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating despite a short-run incentive to cheat; the other community reciprocates trust by not punishing deviations during this phase. Trust-building is followed by cooperative play, sustained through community enforcement.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 14 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1387-1433 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Thema
Community enforcement
contagion
anonymous random matching
repeated games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Deb, Joyee
González-Díaz, Julio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New Haven, CT
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE2404
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Deb, Joyee
  • González-Díaz, Julio
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2019

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