On the stability of cooperation structures

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [Econometrica, 57 (1989), 589--614]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 20.2002

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Cooperation structure ; graph ; Myerson value ; stability ; potential ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Haeringer, Guillaume
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2002

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119633
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET