Arbeitspapier

Cooperation on Climate-Change Mitigation

We model countries’ choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international institutions capable of enforcing environmental agreements on sovereign nations, we analyze self-enforcing climate-change treaties that are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. In simulations based on current conditions, we explore the structure of a selfenforcing agreement that achieves efficient climate change policy.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5698

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Thema
international agreements
climate change
differential games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mason, Charles F.
Polasky, Stephen
Tarui, Nori
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2016

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mason, Charles F.
  • Polasky, Stephen
  • Tarui, Nori
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2016

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