Cooperation on Climate-Change Mitigation

Arbeitspapier

We model countries’ choice of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as a dynamic game. Emissions generate immediate benefits to the emitting country but also increase atmospheric GHG concentrations that negatively affect present and future welfare of all countries. Because there are no international institutions capable of enforcing environmental agreements on sovereign nations, we analyze self-enforcing climate-change treaties that are supportable as subgame perfect equilibria. In simulations based on current conditions, we explore the structure of a selfenforcing agreement that achieves efficient climate change policy.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 5698

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
• Subject: international agreements ; climate change ; differential games

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Mason, Charles F. ; Polasky, Stephen ; Tarui, Nori
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2016

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/128394
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET