On the stability of cooperation structures

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies the payoff structure of stable cooperation structures in link formation games. Players choose non-cooperatively with whom they want to form a link, and the payoffs are given by the Myerson value of the cooperation structure obtained. We characterize the class of TU-games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, which turns out to be much larger than the class of superadditive TU-games. We then provide an exact characterization of the Moderer and Shapley potential of the link formation game, and establish its equivalence with the potential as defined by Hart and Mas-Colell [Econometrica, 57 (1989), 589--614]. We use this result to show that stable but Pareto dominated graphs can emerge under simple best-response dynamics.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 20.2002

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games
• Thema: Cooperation structure ; graph ; Myerson value ; stability ; potential ; Kooperatives Spiel ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Haeringer, Guillaume
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2002

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/119633
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ