Minimum participation rules with heterogeneous countries

Arbeitspapier

Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous countries to study the endogenous choice of a minimum participation rule and its role for the success of international environmental agreements.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2009,077

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Externalities ; Public Goods ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: Minimum participation rules ; international environmental agreements ; coalition formation ; transboundary pollution ; environmental policy coordination ; Umweltabkommen ; Mitgliedschaft ; Finanzierung ; Partizipation ; Internationale Umweltpolitik ; Koalition ; Theorie ; Welt

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Weikard, Hans-Peter ; Wangler, Leo ; Freytag, Andreas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32554
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET