Artikel
AGENDA CONTROL AND RECIPROCITY IN SEQUENTIAL VOTING DECISIONS
We study how reciprocity affects the extent to which a chair can exploit her control over an agenda if a committee votes sequentially on a known series of binary proposals. We show in a parsimonious laboratory experiment that committee members form vote trading coalitions favoring early proposals not only when the sequence of proposals is exogenously given, but also when a chair controls the sequence of proposals. Vote trading occurs even though chairs manipulate the agenda in their favor. Punishment for chairs exploiting agenda control is weak as chairs reciprocate support by others more frequently than nonchairs. (JEL C92, D71, D72)
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Economic Inquiry ; ISSN: 1465-7295 ; Volume: 58 ; Year: 2020 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1813-1829 ; Boston, USA: Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Fischbacher, Urs
Schudy, Simeon
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- (where)
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Boston, USA
- (when)
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2020
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/ecin.12898
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Fischbacher, Urs
- Schudy, Simeon
- Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Time of origin
- 2020
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