Non-comparative versus comparative advertising as a quality signal

Arbeitspapier

Two firms produce a product with a horizontal and a vertical characteristic. We call the vertical characteristic quality. The difference in the quality levels determines how the firms share the market. Firms know the quality levels, consumers do not. Under non-comparative advertising a firm may signal its own quality. Under comparative advertising firms may signal the quality differential. In both scenarios the firms may attempt to mislead at a cost. If firms advertise, in both scenarios equilibria are revealing. Under comparative advertising the firms never advertise together which they may do under non-comparative advertising.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Papers ; No. 08-05

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Litigation Process ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: advertising ; costly state falsification ; signalling ; Werbung ; Vergleichende Werbung ; Signalling ; Kosten ; Wohlfahrtsanalyse ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Emons, Winand ; Fluet, Claude
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bern, Department of Economics
• (wo): Bern
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/76756
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ