Arbeitspapier

Incentives in supply function equilibrium

The author analyses delegation in homogenous duopoly under the assumption that the firm-managers compete in supply functions. In supply function equilibrium, managers' decisions are strategic complements. This reverses earlier findings in that the author finds that owners give managers incentives to act in an accommodating way. As a result, optimal delegation reduces per-firm output and increases profits to above-Cournot profits. Moreover, in supply function equilibrium the mode of competition is endogenous. This means that the author avoids results that are sensitive with respect to assuming either Cournot or Bertrand competition.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2014-38

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Thema
Delegation
incentives
supply function equilibrium

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Vetter, Henrik
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
(wo)
Kiel
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Vetter, Henrik
  • Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)

Entstanden

  • 2014

Ähnliche Objekte (12)