Arbeitspapier

Public Funding of Political Parties

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 368

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Schultz, Christian
Ortuno-OrtÍn, Ignacio
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2000

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Schultz, Christian
  • Ortuno-OrtÍn, Ignacio
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2000

Other Objects (12)