Arbeitspapier

Public Funding of Political Parties

This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parteis receive public funds depending on their vote share. Funds finance electoral campaigns. Two cases are investigated. In the first, some voters are policy motivated and some are ?impressionable? ? their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In the second, campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated. Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The effect is larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are informative, there may be multiple euqilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay large since it receives large funds.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 368

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schultz, Christian
Ortuno-OrtÍn, Ignacio
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schultz, Christian
  • Ortuno-OrtÍn, Ignacio
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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