Arbeitspapier

Fiscal Competition in Space and Time

This paper analyzes fiscal competition among numerous spatially- separated jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework. The degree of factor mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because it is costly and time-consuming to adjust factor stocks. Even if it is harmful in the long run, a jurisdiction's residents can benefit in the short run from taxing mobile factors owned by non-residents. The optimal tax on mobile factors is lower, the faster the speed with which factors adjust to fiscal policy. Anticipated taxes are less beneficial than those that can be imposed unexpectedly.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 370

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Public Economics: General
Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics: General

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Wildasin, David E.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Wildasin, David E.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2000

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