Social image concerns and welfare take-up

Arbeitspapier

Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that social image concerns causally reduce the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design manipulates the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on ability or luck, and how the transfer is financed. We find that subjects avoid the inference both of being low-skilled (ability stigma) and of being willing to live of others (free-rider stigma). Using a placebo treatment, we exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effects. Although stigma reduces take-up, elicitation of political preferences reveals that only a minority of "taxpayers" vote for the public transfer.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2016-208r

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Household ; Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
• Subject: stigma ; signaling ; redistribution ; non take-up ; welfare program

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Friedrichsen, Jana ; König, Tobias ; Schmacker, Renke
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (where): Berlin
• (when): 2018

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/181024
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET