The positive economics of labor market rigidities and investor protection

Arbeitspapier

This paper presents a positive model which shows that institutional setups on capital and labor markets might be intertwined by politicoeconomic forces. Some countries especially in continental Europe exhibit a corporatist politicoeconomic equilibrium with a sustantial protection of insiders on both markets. The more important money is in political decision-making, the more devided the workface is, and the more globalized capital markets are, the more likely is a capitalist politicoeconomic equilibrium with little employment and substantial investor protection. Our prediction of a negative cross-country relationship between labor market rigidities and of competition on capital markets receives considerable empicical support.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 456

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance ; Business and Securities Law ; Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
• Thema: labor markets ; employment protection ; corporatism ; corporate governance ; shareholder protection ; political economy ; Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung ; Korporatismus ; Public Choice ; Arbeitsrecht ; Aktienrecht ; Corporate Governance ; Insider-Outsider-Modell ; Schätzung ; Theorie ; Welt

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Fehn, Rainer ; Meier, Carsten-Patrick
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2001

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/2596
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ