Arbeitspapier

Executive board composition and bank risk taking

Little is known about how socioeconomic characteristics of executive teams affect corporate governance in banking. Exploiting a unique dataset, we show how age, gender, and education composition of executive teams affect risk taking of financial institutions. First, we establish that age, gender, and education jointly affect the variability of bank performance. Second, we use difference-in-difference estimations that focus exclusively on mandatory executive retirements and find that younger executive teams increase risk taking, as do board changes that result in a higher proportion of female executives. In contrast, if board changes increase the representation of executives holding Ph.D. degrees, risk taking declines.

ISBN
978-3-86558-795-4
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bundesbank Discussion Paper ; No. 03/2012

Classification
Wirtschaft
Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Analysis of Education
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Subject
Banks
executives
risk taking
age
gender
education
Bankmanager
Führungskräfte
Risikopräferenz
Bankrisiko
Schätzung
Deutschland

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Berger, Allen N.
Kick, Thomas
Schaeck, Klaus
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsche Bundesbank
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Berger, Allen N.
  • Kick, Thomas
  • Schaeck, Klaus
  • Deutsche Bundesbank

Time of origin

  • 2012

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