Internal and external political competition

Arbeitspapier

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) benefits citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to fight for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2009,067

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
• Subject: political competition ; dictatorship ; democracy ; transitions ; Politik ; Institutioneller Wettbewerb ; Public Choice ; Diktatur ; Demokratie ; Politischer Wandel ; Demokratisierung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Hugh-Jones, David
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32577
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:47 AM CET