Arbeitspapier

Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem

We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring the simplest case, where decisions of the third party are made randomly we obtain a stable solution, where players do not have any incentive to refer to such a third party. While neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are able to ensure stability in case reference to a third party is possible, we found that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution seems to always dominate the stable allocation which constitutes novel support in favor of the latter.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: ICAE Working Paper Series ; No. 67

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
Bargaining problem
Nash solution
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Stability
Brownian motion
Feynman-Kac formula
partial differential equation

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kapeller, Jakob
Steinerberger, Stefan
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Johannes Kepler University Linz, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy (ICAE)
(where)
Linz
(when)
2017

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kapeller, Jakob
  • Steinerberger, Stefan
  • Johannes Kepler University Linz, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy (ICAE)

Time of origin

  • 2017

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