Arbeitspapier
Stability, Fairness and Random Walks in the Bargaining Problem
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring the simplest case, where decisions of the third party are made randomly we obtain a stable solution, where players do not have any incentive to refer to such a third party. While neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are able to ensure stability in case reference to a third party is possible, we found that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution seems to always dominate the stable allocation which constitutes novel support in favor of the latter.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ICAE Working Paper Series ; No. 67
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Bargaining problem
Nash solution
Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution
Stability
Brownian motion
Feynman-Kac formula
partial differential equation
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kapeller, Jakob
Steinerberger, Stefan
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Johannes Kepler University Linz, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy (ICAE)
- (where)
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Linz
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kapeller, Jakob
- Steinerberger, Stefan
- Johannes Kepler University Linz, Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of the Economy (ICAE)
Time of origin
- 2017