Arbeitspapier

A Kink that Makes You Sick: The Incentive Effect of Sick Pay on Absence

This paper examines the effect of the replacement rule of the Finnish sickness insurance system on the duration of sickness absence. A pre-determined, piecewise linear policy rule in which the replacement rate is determined by past earnings allows identification of the effect using a regression kink design. We find a substantial and robust behavioral response. The statistically significant point estimate of the elasticity of the duration of sickness absence with respect to the replacement rate is on the order of 1.4.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 8205

Classification
Wirtschaft
Health Insurance, Public and Private
Health: Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Subject
sick pay
labor supply
sickness absence
paid sick leave
regression kink design

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Böckerman, Petri
Kanninen, Ohto
Suoniemi, Ilpo
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Böckerman, Petri
  • Kanninen, Ohto
  • Suoniemi, Ilpo
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2014

Other Objects (12)