Arbeitspapier
Incentives, Performance and Choking in Darts
This paper examines the effect of incentives on the performance of darts players. We analyze four data sets comprising a total of 123,402 darts matches of professional, amateur, and youth players. The game of darts offers an attractive natural research setting, because performance can be observed at the individual level and without the obscuring effects of risk considerations and the behavior of others. We find that amateur and youth players perform better under moderately higher incentives, but choke when the incentives are really high. Professional players similarly display better performance under higher incentives, but appear less susceptible of choking. These results speak to a growing literature on the limits of increasing incentives as a recipe for better performance.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2018-101/IV
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Sports Economics: General
- Subject
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incentives
choking under pressure
performance
darts
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Klein Teeselink, Bouke
Potter van Loon, Rogier J. D.
van den Assem, Martijn J.
van Dolder, Dennie
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Klein Teeselink, Bouke
- Potter van Loon, Rogier J. D.
- van den Assem, Martijn J.
- van Dolder, Dennie
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2018
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