Arbeitspapier

On the efficient provision of public goods by means of lotteries

We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We rather extend the model of Morgan (2000), who used fair raffles as voluntary contribution schemes, to unfair or biased raffles, which we show to be equivalent to fair raffles whose tickets are sold to consumers at different individual prices. We give a detailed account of the solution for the case of two different consumers and discuss its implications for the general case of many consumers.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4109

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Public Goods
Subject
public good provision
biased lotteries
charities

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Franke, Jörg
Leininger, Wolfgang
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2013

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Franke, Jörg
  • Leininger, Wolfgang
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2013

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