Arbeitspapier

Shaking Criminal Incentives

We study criminal incentives exploiting the devastating shock of the 1995 Kobe earthquake. Evidence shows that the earthquake decreased burglaries but left other crime types unaffected. The effect stays significant even after controlling for unemployment, policing and income. We corroborate this by instrumenting damages with the distance from the earthquake epicentre. These findings survive various robustness checks under different specifications. The evidence is consistent with a simple theory of crime, value and specialization. We conclude that burglars respond to damages that devaluate their prospective takings. Yet, they cannot shift their specialization and substitute burglaries with other crime types.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 12781

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Thema
crime
burglary
value
housing damage
specialization

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Aoki, Yu
Koutmeridis, Theodore
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Aoki, Yu
  • Koutmeridis, Theodore
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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