Arbeitspapier

Trading away incentives

Equity pay has been the primary component of managerial compensation packages at US public firms since the early 1990s. Using a comprehensive sample of top executives from 1992-2020, we estimate to what extent they trade firm equity held in their portfolios to neutralize increments in ownership due to annual equity pay. Executives accommodate ownership increases linked to options awards. Conversely, increases in stock holdings linked to option exercises and restricted stock grants are largely neutralized through comparable sales of unrestricted shares. Variation in stock trading responses across executives hardly appears to respond to diversification motives. From a theoretical standpoint, these results challenge (i) the common, generally implicit assumption that managers cannot undo their incentive packages, (ii) the standard modeling practice of treating different equity pay items homogeneously, and (iii) the often taken for granted crucial role of diversification motives in managers' portfolio choices.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IWH Discussion Papers ; No. 23/2022

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
Thema
dynamic contracting
equity incentives
executive compensation
hedging
insider trading

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Colonnello, Stefano
Curatola, Giuliano Antonio
Xia, Shuo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)
(wo)
Halle (Saale)
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Colonnello, Stefano
  • Curatola, Giuliano Antonio
  • Xia, Shuo
  • Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH)

Entstanden

  • 2022

Ähnliche Objekte (12)