Arbeitspapier
Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements
This paper analyses whether different emissions trading regimes provide different incentives to participate in a cooperative climate agreement. Different incentive structures are discussed for those countries, namely the US, Russia and China, that are most important in the climate negotiation process. Our analysis confirms the conjecture that, by appropriately designing the emission trading regime, it is possible to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement. Therefore, participation and optimal policy should be jointly analysed. Moreover, our results show that the US, Russia and China have different most preferred climate coalitions and therefore adopt conflicting negotiation strategies.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 104.2003
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Taxation and Subsidies: Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Water
Renewable Resources and Conservation: Government Policy
- Thema
-
Agreements
Climate
Incentives
Negotiations
Policy
Klimaschutz
Umweltabkommen
Anreiz
USA
Russland
China
Emissionshandel
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Buchner, Barbara
Carraro, Carlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Buchner, Barbara
- Carraro, Carlo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2003
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