Arbeitspapier
Corporate income taxation of multinationals and fiscal equalization
This paper investigates the effect of fiscal equalization on the efficiency properties of corporate income tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a Nash tax competition game under the taxation principles of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. Fiscal equalization ensures efficiency if the marginal transfer just reflects the fiscal and pecuniary externalities of tax rates. In contrast to previous studies, tax base equalization (Representative Tax System) does not satisfy this condition, but combining tax revenue and private income equalization does, regardless of which taxation principle is implemented. Under Formula Apportionment, tax base equalization is superior to tax revenue equalization if the wage income externality is sufficiently large.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2747
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
- Subject
-
separate accounting
formula apportionment
fiscal equalization
Körperschaftsteuer
Steuertarif
Formula Apportionment
Steuerbemessung
Steuerharmonisierung
Steuerwettbewerb
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Steuerwirkung
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Liesegang, Caterina
Runkel, Marco
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Liesegang, Caterina
- Runkel, Marco
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2009
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