Arbeitspapier

Corporate income taxation of multinationals and fiscal equalization

This paper investigates the effect of fiscal equalization on the efficiency properties of corporate income tax rates chosen by symmetric countries in a Nash tax competition game under the taxation principles of Separate Accounting and Formula Apportionment. Fiscal equalization ensures efficiency if the marginal transfer just reflects the fiscal and pecuniary externalities of tax rates. In contrast to previous studies, tax base equalization (Representative Tax System) does not satisfy this condition, but combining tax revenue and private income equalization does, regardless of which taxation principle is implemented. Under Formula Apportionment, tax base equalization is superior to tax revenue equalization if the wage income externality is sufficiently large.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2747

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Business Taxes and Subsidies including sales and value-added (VAT)
State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
separate accounting
formula apportionment
fiscal equalization
Körperschaftsteuer
Steuertarif
Formula Apportionment
Steuerbemessung
Steuerharmonisierung
Steuerwettbewerb
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Steuerwirkung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Liesegang, Caterina
Runkel, Marco
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Liesegang, Caterina
  • Runkel, Marco
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2009

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