Arbeitspapier
On some collusive and signaling equilibria in ascending auctions for multiple objects
We consider two ascending auctions and show that many of the (unwanted) collusive or signaling equilibria studied in the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both auctions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 62.2001
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
Multi-unit auctions
ascending auctions
FCC auctions
Auktionstheorie
Signalling
Kartell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Albano, Gian Luigi
Germano, Fabrizio
Lovo, Stefano
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Albano, Gian Luigi
- Germano, Fabrizio
- Lovo, Stefano
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2001
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
English Auctions and Walrasian Equilibria with Multiple Objects: a dynamic approach
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Multiple equilibria and protectionism
Algorithms for Computing Equilibria in Auctions
Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria
Auctions with signaling concerns
Auctions with Signaling Concerns
Multiple-Object Auctions
Multiple equilibria in markets and games
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Signaling in First-Price Auctions
English Auctions and Walrasian Equilibria with Multiple Objects: a dynamic approach
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Multiple equilibria and protectionism
Algorithms for Computing Equilibria in Auctions
Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria
Auctions with signaling concerns
Auctions with Signaling Concerns
Multiple-Object Auctions
Multiple equilibria in markets and games
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions
Signaling in First-Price Auctions
English Auctions and Walrasian Equilibria with Multiple Objects: a dynamic approach
Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria in all-pay auctions
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
Multiple equilibria and protectionism
Algorithms for Computing Equilibria in Auctions
Monetary Policy and Multiple Equilibria
Auctions with signaling concerns
Auctions with Signaling Concerns
Multiple-Object Auctions
Multiple equilibria in markets and games
Supply Function Equilibria of Pay-as-Bid Auctions