The Effect of Losing and Winning on Cheating and Effort in Repeated Competitions

Arbeitspapier

Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects compete with different types of opponents in the second round (random/based on first-round outcome). We find that (i) losing causes competitors to increase cheating in the second round while winning implies a tendency to reduce cheating. A similar effect is found with regard to effort, which losers increase to a larger extent than winners. (ii) Competitor matching does not significantly affect behavior.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9744

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy ; Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
• Subject: cheating ; effort ; competition ; competitor ; social recognition ; laboratory experiment

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Necker, Sarah ; Paetzel, Fabian
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2022

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/260874
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET