Arbeitspapier

Guess what: it's the settlements!

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading, clearing and settlement as one operation. We show that such vertical silos can prevent efficiency gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms to be realized. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, there is no mechanism that achieves the merger of the vertical silos in a way that trading and settlement are produced efficiently after the merger. Furthermore, we show that such an ex-post efficient merger can always be implemented by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ECB Working Paper ; No. 375

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Thema
Clearing and Settlement
Horizontal and Vertical Integration
Mechanism Design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koeppl, Thorsten Volker
Monnet, Cyril
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
European Central Bank (ECB)
(wo)
Frankfurt a. M.
(wann)
2004

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koeppl, Thorsten Volker
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • European Central Bank (ECB)

Entstanden

  • 2004

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