Artikel
Monopolistic group design with peer effects
In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are a consequence of anonymous pricing and do not depend upon the nature of the peer effects. This general approach also allows us to assess the way the `returns to scale' of peer technology and the cost of group formation affect the optimal group structure.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 89-125 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- Thema
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Mechanism design
peer effects
public goods
network effects
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Board, Simon
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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The Econometric Society
- (wo)
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New York, NY
- (wann)
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2009
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Board, Simon
- The Econometric Society
Entstanden
- 2009