Artikel

Monopolistic group design with peer effects

In a range of settings, private firms manage peer effects by sorting agents into different groups, be they schools, communities, or product categories. This paper considers such a firm, which controls group entry by setting a series of anonymous prices. We show that private provision systematically leads to two distortions relative to the efficient solution: first, agents are segregated too finely; second, too many agents are excluded from all groups. We demonstrate that these distortions are a consequence of anonymous pricing and do not depend upon the nature of the peer effects. This general approach also allows us to assess the way the `returns to scale' of peer technology and the cost of group formation affect the optimal group structure.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2009 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 89-125 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Publicly Provided Goods: General
Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
Thema
Mechanism design
peer effects
public goods
network effects

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Board, Simon
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
The Econometric Society
(wo)
New York, NY
(wann)
2009

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Board, Simon
  • The Econometric Society

Entstanden

  • 2009

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