Arbeitspapier
Strategic investment, forward markets and competition
I model the strategic interaction between firms, that face decisions on investment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment decision that takes place after firms have contracted forward but before firms compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition becomes fierce. Thus, the efficiency gains from forward trading found by Allaz and Villa (1993) still are present. However, for an investment that takes place before firms contract forward (long term investment), competition becomes rather weak. When investment matters, from a welfare point of view the desirability of forward trading critically depends on the structure of decision making.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 76
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
Industrial Organization
Strategic Investment
Forward Trading
Cournot Competition
Energy Markets
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Aichele, Markus
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
- (wo)
-
Tübingen
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-576975
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Aichele, Markus
- University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
Entstanden
- 2014