Arbeitspapier

Strategic investment, forward markets and competition

I model the strategic interaction between firms, that face decisions on investment, forward contracts and spot market quantities. For an investment decision that takes place after firms have contracted forward but before firms compete on the spot market (medium term investment), competition becomes fierce. Thus, the efficiency gains from forward trading found by Allaz and Villa (1993) still are present. However, for an investment that takes place before firms contract forward (long term investment), competition becomes rather weak. When investment matters, from a welfare point of view the desirability of forward trading critically depends on the structure of decision making.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: University of Tübingen Working Papers in Economics and Finance ; No. 76

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
Industrial Organization
Strategic Investment
Forward Trading
Cournot Competition
Energy Markets

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Aichele, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences
(wo)
Tübingen
(wann)
2014

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:21-dspace-576975
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Aichele, Markus
  • University of Tübingen, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences

Entstanden

  • 2014

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