Arbeitspapier

Restraining the genuine homo economicus: why the economy cannot be divorced from its governance

The Homo economicus of traditional economics is far from being completely self-interested, rational, or as individualistic as he is purported to be; he will haggle to death over price but will not take what he wants by force. Implicitly, he is assumed to behave ruthlessly within a well-defined bubble of sainthood. Based on a simple model, I first examine what occurs when this assumption is relaxed and genuine, amoral Homines economici interact. Productivity can be inversely related to compensation; a longer shadow of the future can intensify conflict; and, more competition among providers of protection reduces welfare. The patently inefficient outcomes that follow call for restraining self-interest, for finding ways to govern markets. I then review some of the different ways of creating restraints, from the traditional social contract, to the hierarchical domination of kings and lords, to modern forms of governance. Checks and balances, wider representation, the bureaucratic form of organization, and other ingredients of modern governance can partly be thought of as providing restraints to the dark side of self-interest. Though highly imperfect, these restraints are better than the alternative, which typically involves autocratic, amateurish, and corrupt rule. Then, thinking of most problems in terms of a first-best economic model is practically and scientifically misguided.

Weitere Titel
Die Beschränkung des genuinen Homo Economicus: Warum wirtschaftliche Prozesse und Governancestrukturen untrennbar sind
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2003-03

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Conflict
property rights
governance

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Skaperdas, Stergios
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(wo)
Berlin
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Skaperdas, Stergios
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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