Arbeitspapier

Don't demotivate, discriminate

This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria exist where the manager discriminates in favor of the employee whom the employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating the 'favorite'. We show that the non-discriminatory equilibrium is unstable. Yet the manager would prefer to commit not to discriminate.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-017/VII

Classification
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
Subject
discrimination
confidence management
Bayesian games

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.
Swank, Otto H.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Tinbergen Institute
(where)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.
  • Swank, Otto H.
  • Tinbergen Institute

Time of origin

  • 2014

Other Objects (12)