Arbeitspapier
Don't demotivate, discriminate
This paper offers a new theory of discrimination in the workplace. We consider a manager who has to assign two tasks to two employees. The manager has superior information about the employees' abilities. We show that besides an equilibrium where the manager does not discriminate, equilibria exist where the manager discriminates in favor of the employee whom the employees expect to be favored. The manager, who has no taste for discrimination, discriminates in order to avoid demotivating the 'favorite'. We show that the non-discriminatory equilibrium is unstable. Yet the manager would prefer to commit not to discriminate.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 14-017/VII
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Labor Discrimination
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Subject
-
discrimination
confidence management
Bayesian games
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.
Swank, Otto H.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (where)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (when)
-
2014
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kamphorst, Jurjen J. A.
- Swank, Otto H.
- Tinbergen Institute
Time of origin
- 2014