Arbeitspapier

Enhancing market power by reducing switching costs

Competing firms often have the possibility to jointly determine the magnitude of consumers' switching costs. Examples include compatibility decisions and the option of introducing number portability in telecom and banking. We put forward a model where firms jointly decide to reduce switching costs before competing in prices during two periods. We demonstrate that the outcome hinges crucially on how the joint action reduces consumers' switching costs. In particular, firms will enhance their market power if they implement measures that reduce consumers' switching costs by a lump sum. Conversely, they will preserve market power by not implementing actions that reduce switching costs proportionally. Hence, when policy makers design consumer protection policies, they should not always adopt a favourable attitude towards efforts by firms to reduce switching costs.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2449

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Thema
Switching costs
market power
welfare
Wechselkosten
Marktmacht
Preiswettbewerb
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Bouckaert, Jan
Degryse, Hans
Provoost, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Bouckaert, Jan
  • Degryse, Hans
  • Provoost, Thomas
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2008

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