Side-Channel Analysis and Countermeasures for Physical Unclonable Functions : Ring-Based PUF Primitives, Bit Derivation and BCH Codes
- Alternative title
-
Seitenkanalanalyse und Gegenmaßnahmen für Physical Unclonable Functions
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
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Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Notes
-
München, Technische Universität München, Dissertation, 2023
- Keyword
-
Computersicherheit
Eingebettetes System
Biometrie
Elektronisches Gerät
Digitaltechnik
Schlüsselverteilung
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
München
- (who)
-
Universitätsbibliothek der TU München
- (when)
-
2023
- Creator
-
Tebelmann, Lars
- Contributor
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:91-diss-20230921-1695134-1-0
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
15.08.2025, 7:24 AM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Tebelmann, Lars
- Sigl, Georg
- Danger, Jean-Luc
- Universitätsbibliothek der TU München
Time of origin
- 2023
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Plaintext: a missing feature for enhancing the power of deep learning in side-channel analysis? : reaking multiple layers of side-channel countermeasures
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Provable Secure Countermeasures Against Side-Channel Attacks
Key Derivation with Physical Unclonable Functions
Advances in algorithmic side-channel countermeasures for modern cryptography
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New insights to key derivation for tamper-evident physical unclonable functions
Plaintext: a missing feature for enhancing the power of deep learning in side-channel analysis? : reaking multiple layers of side-channel countermeasures
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Reichenbuch BCH
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Advances in algorithmic side-channel countermeasures for modern cryptography
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New insights to key derivation for tamper-evident physical unclonable functions
Plaintext: a missing feature for enhancing the power of deep learning in side-channel analysis? : reaking multiple layers of side-channel countermeasures
BCH
BCH
Reichenbuch BCH
Rosenberg BCH
Muckental BCH