Cross-subsidization and matching design

Arbeitspapier

We develop a theory of price discrimination in many-to-many matching markets in which agents' preferences are vertically and horizontally differentiated. The optimal plans induce negative assortative matching at the margin: agents with a low value for interacting with other agents are included in the matching sets of only those agents from the opposite side whose value for matching is sufficiently high (cross-subsidization). We deliver testable predictions relating the optimal matching plans and price schedules to the distribution of the agents' preferences and attractiveness. The analysis has implications for the design of business-to-business platforms, advertising, and cable TV packages.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1559

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: many-to-many matching ; two-sided markets ; networks ; asymmetric information ; incentives ; mechanism design ; many-to-many matching ; two-sided markets ; networks ; asymmetric information ; incentives ; mechanism design

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Gomes, Renato ; Pavan, Alessandro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (wo): Evanston, IL
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97247
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ