Arbeitspapier | Working paper

Online ad auctions: an experiment

A human subject laboratory experiment compares the real-time market performance of the two most popular auction formats for online ad space, Vickrey- Clarke-Groves (VCG) and Generalized Second Price (GSP). Theoretical predictions made in papers by Varian (2007) and Edelman et al. (2007) seem to organize the data well overall. Efficiency under VCG exceeds that under GSP in nearly all treatments. The difference is economically significant in the more competitive parameter configurations and is statistically significant in most treatments. Revenue capture tends to be similar across auction formats in most treatments.

Online ad auctions: an experiment

Urheber*in: McLaughlin, Kevin; Friedman, Daniel

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Extent
Seite(n): 33
Language
Englisch
Notes
Status: Veröffentlichungsversion

Bibliographic citation
Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Entscheidung, Forschungsprofessur Market Design: Theory and Pragmatics (SP II 2016-501)

Subject
Wirtschaft
Publizistische Medien, Journalismus,Verlagswesen
Marketing
interaktive, elektronische Medien
Werbung
Auktion
Online-Dienst

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
McLaughlin, Kevin
Friedman, Daniel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH
(where)
Deutschland, Berlin
(when)
2016

Handle
Rights
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Last update
21.06.2024, 4:27 PM CEST

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • McLaughlin, Kevin
  • Friedman, Daniel
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH

Time of origin

  • 2016

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