Arbeitspapier

Do voters or politicians choose the outcomes of elections? Evidence from high-stakes U.S. state legislative elections

We study whether political parties exert precise control over the outcomes of legislative elections. We test for discontinuities in two outcomes that, in the absence of precise control, should be smooth at the threshold that determines control of the legislature: the identity of the party that previously held a majority, and the probability density of the election outcome. We apply these tests to high-stakes state elections that determine which party controls Congressional redistricting. We find overwhelming evidence of precise control, suggesting the majority party can - through legal means - ensure it retains just enough seats to stay in power.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 741

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jeong, Dahyeon
Shenoy, Ajay
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Economics Department
(wo)
Santa Cruz, CA
(wann)
2017

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jeong, Dahyeon
  • Shenoy, Ajay
  • University of California, Economics Department

Entstanden

  • 2017

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