Artikel

Risk attitudes and informal employment in a developing economy

We model an urban labour market in a developing economy, incorporating workers' risk attitudes. Trade-offs between risk aversion and ability determine worker allocation across formal and informal wage employment, and voluntary and involuntary self employment. Greater risk of informal wage non-payment can raise or lower informal wage employment, depending on the source of risk. Informal wage employment can be reduced by increasing detection efforts or by strengthening contract enforcement for informal wage payment. As the average ability of workers rises, informal wage employment first rises, then falls. Greater demand for formal production may lead to more involuntary self employment.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: IZA Journal of Labor & Development ; ISSN: 2193-9020 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2012 ; Pages: 1-17 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Labor Demand
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Subject
risk attitudes
informality
self employment
Städtischer Arbeitsmarkt
Arbeitsangebot
Risikoaversion
Informeller Sektor
Arbeitsmarktsegmentation
Entwicklungsländer
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bennett, John
Gould, Matthew
Rablen, Matthew D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2012

DOI
doi:10.1186/2193-9020-1-5
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Bennett, John
  • Gould, Matthew
  • Rablen, Matthew D.
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2012

Other Objects (12)